DBA Sensation

December 10, 2009

useful windows logo key tips

Filed under: 6. MISC — zhefeng @ 10:32 am

Press To
Windows logo key Display or hide the Start menu
Windows logo key+L Lock the computer
Windows logo key+BREAK Display the System Properties dialog box
Windows logo key+D Show the desktop
Windows logo key+M Minimize all windows
Windows logo key+SHIFT+M Restore minimized windows
Windows logo key+E Open My Computer
Windows logo key+F Search for a file or folder
CTRL+Windows logo key+F Search for computers
Windows logo key+F1 Display Windows Help
Windows logo key+R Open the Run dialog box
Windows logo key+U Open Utility Manager

Application key Display the Shortcut menu for the selected item

November 12, 2009

chm can’t be opened

Filed under: 6. MISC — Tags: , — zhefeng @ 2:21 pm

My desktop somehow couldn’t open the chm file which was ok before.
After researching i found it’s the microsoft updates caused this:

The solution will be open permissions for this kind of chm file. Copy/paste the following code to a text file then save it as .reg, run it and resolve the problem!



March 4, 2009

Unix File and Directory Permissions and Modes

Filed under: 6. MISC — Tags: , , , , , — zhefeng @ 9:47 am

Unix File and Directory Permissions and Modes

© 2001–2006 by Wayne Pollock, Tampa Florida USA.

Each file or directory contains 12 settable permission (or mode) bits, which means there are 2**12 = 4096 possible permission settings!  The 12 bits are either on (set to 1) or off (set to zero).  Each can be changed independently.

Unix doesn’t support the idea of inherited permissions.  So, unlike other systems, setting read permission on a directory for some user does not give that user read permission on the files within that directory.

Note that permissions do not grant users the right to run certain programs, rather they grant the right to use certain system calls (of the Unix API).  A command such as cat or more is written using the read() system call, and only files and directories that have the “r” permission for a user permit the use of this system call.  This is why a user can’t use more, vi, etc., on any file on which they don’t have “r” permission.  Similarly, a user must have “w” permission to write() a file or directory, which is the system call used to modify files and directories (which are files too).  The “x” permission permits a user to exec() a file, which means to execute it as a program.  (In Unix, a program or application is just a file that has execute (“x”) permission.)

In short any program makes one or more system calls to access files and directories.  A user process must have been granted the appropriate permissions (one or more of “r” for read, “w for write”, or “x” for execute) or the access will fail.  Note that other system calls (such as stat()) will also fail if the right permissions aren’t granted.

To see all the system calls a given program uses, you can use the strace command.  (This may produce a lot of output!)  Once you know which system call is used, you can check the man pages for that system call to see what permissions are needed to use it.  (See note.)
Classes of Users

The basic permissions of “r”, “w”, and “x”, are applied to three different categories of users.  Note that every file and directory in Unix is identified with an owner and a group.  The categories are owner (occasionally referred to as the file’s user or user owner), group (or group owner), and others.  (See note.)

In addition to these nine mode bits (“r”, “w”, and “x”, for each of three categories of owner, group, and others), there are three others: the set User ID (SUID or setuid), the set Group ID (SGID or setgid), and the sticky (or text) bit.  The effect of these three bits depends on what other modes are set, and differs for files and directories.

If the person (*) attempting to read, write, or execute a file is the same as the owner, the first set of permissions is used and the remaining six bits (three for group and three for others) are ignored.  But if the person is not the same as the owner, the system will check the group of the file against all the groups the person is a member of.  If there is a match then the second set of permissions are used.  If the person is not the owner and not a member of the group for the file, then the third set of permissions is used to determine what access the person is allowed.

To see the permissions for files and directories use the ls -l filename command.  (On a directory, use the ls -ld directoryname command since otherwise ls gives information on the files within that directory and not on the directory itself.)  To illustrate, suppose the permissions for a file named foo are listed as follows:

-rw-r—–    1 Hymie   staff         78 Aug 14 13:08 foo

The first dash indicates an ordinary file.  On a directory you would see a “d” instead.  The next nine characters tell what permissions have been granted.  The first three (“rw-“) indicate what permissions have been granted to the owner (“Hymie”) of the file.  In this case the owner has been granted read and write permission, but not execute permission.  The next three show what permissions have been granted to members of the file’s group.  Here (“r–“) they show that group “Staff” members have read access only.  The last three characters show that the others (i.e., not the owner “Hymie” and not members of group “Staff”) have no permissions granted.

Note the SUID, SGID, and sticky bits have no columns of their own in an ls output, but if turned on they show up as special characters (that is, not “x” or “-“) in the execute columns for the owner, group, and others.  The SUID bit displays as an “S” in the owner’s execute column of the output.  If the execute bit is also set then an “s” is used.  The SGID bit appears similarly in the group’s execute column.  The sticky bit appears in the others’ execute column, as a “T” or as a “t” if the others execute bit is also set.

An example:

-rwsr-S–t    1 Hymie   staff         78 Aug 14 13:08 foo

Here, the owner (Hymie) is granted read, write, and execute permission, the group members (staff) are granted read permission, and others are granted execute permission.  In addition, the SUID, SGID, and sticky bits are all set.

Suppose some user attempts to read a file with some Unix command such as cat.  The system call read() is used and the “r” permission is required.  The system checks to see if the user is in fact the owner of the file.  If so, the access is permitted if the owner has been granted “r” permission.  If not, the system check to see if the user is a member of the group of the file.  If so, access is permitted if the group has been granted “r” permission.

If the user is neither the owner nor a member of the file’s group then the access is permitted if others has been granted “r” permission.

The same logic holds for attempts to modify the file (write) or to run it (execute).
Special Considerations on Files:
Execute permission and scripts

If a user has execute (“x”) permission on some file but not read (“r”) permission, he or she can execute the file.  In other words, the file is an application program.  However if the user doesn’t also have read permission he cannot copy the file, since the cp command requires read (“r”) permission to work.

On the other hand, a shell script file with execute permission only will not run!  This is because any script file (including Perl scripts) cannot be executed directly by the system with an exec() system call.  Instead the proper script interpreter (usually shell or Perl) is actually executed.  This interpreter in turn attempts to read the script file.  (It is possible to run a shell script or Perl script without execute permission, by entering “perl script” or “sh script”.)

The proper permissions on a script are both read and execute.  Setting the execute bit on causes the kernel to start up the shell (*) which reads the script.  This is one reason why scripts are less secure than compiled programs; scripts must be readable and executable but compiled programs need only be executable.

The remaining three mode bits also affect access to files.  Their effects depend on the other permissions set.

SUID on a file

If any category of user is granted execute permission, then this bit causes the owner of the resulting process to be that of the file, and not of the user running the program.  So if the program attempts to read() something, the permissions that apply would be for the owner of the file and not the user of the program.

For example, suppose user Jane runs the command “view memo.txt”, and the permissions on the view command and the file memo.txt are as follows:

-rwx–x–x    1 root    bin         4515 Aug 14 13:08 view
-rw——-    1 root    bin          218 Aug 14 13:08 memo.txt

Jane has permission to run view, but not permission to read memo.txt.  So when this view program attempts to read() the file a “permission denied” error will occur.

Suppose we change the view program to have the SUID bit on:

-rws–x–x    1 root    bin         4515 Aug 14 13:08 view

Now, when Jane runs this SUID program, the access to memo.txt is permitted.  When view attempts to read() the file, the system doesn’t think Jane is attempting to read, it thinks “root” is the user.  So the access is allowed.

A similar substitution occurs if the SGID bit is set and any execute bits are set.  The group ID checked is not the current user, but the group of the program.

Technically, every process has a real user (RUID) and a real group (RGID).  These are the user and group of the person who started the process by running some program.  Every process also has an effective user id EUID and EGID.  By default these are the same.  But if you run a program that has the SUID or SGID bits on, the effective UID or effective GID become those of the file, not of the person.

Note that today, many (too many if you ask me) executables use dynamic link libraries.  (DLLs have the extension .so or .so.number on Unix and Linux, where the “so” stands for shared object.)  Such a program controls which libraries to link to at runtime.  This process uses configuration files in /etc but those system-wide defaults can be over-ridden by setting certain environment variables.  This could be a very dangerous security hole for SUID or SGID programs (I write an evil library, then set the environment variables so that your SUID program runs using my evil code), so when the EUID or EGID differ from the RUID or RGID, a suid program ignores the environment variables (e.g., “LD_LIBRARY_PATH”) and only uses DLLs from the standard, preconfigured locations.
SUID and GGID on non-executable files

If the SUID bit is set on a file with no execute bits set the SUID has no effect.  However, if the SGID bit is set on a file without any execute bits set, then some sort of file and/or record locking may be enabled.  This means that if one process has that file open, any other attempts to open it will block.  In Linux and System V systems, when SGID is set on a file that does not have group execute privileges, this indicates a file that is subject to mandatory locking during access (if the filesystem is mounted to support mandatory locking with mount -o mand).  This overload of meaning surprises many and is not universal across Unix-like systems.  In fact, the Open Group’s Single Unix Specification version 2 for chmod(3) permits systems to ignore requests to turn on SGID for files that aren’t executable if such a setting has no meaning.

WARNING:   SUID and SGID programs can be dangerous.  They are not usually needed.  SUID and SGID scripts are incredibly dangerous and can easily allow evil-doers super-user access to your system!!  *Never* allow a SUID or SGID writable program on you system for even a minute!

The Sticky (a.k.a. text) Bit

The sticky bit has no real purpose on files anymore.  It was used to keep a program in memory, so that the next time a user starts that program it would start faster.  This is obsolete on modern systems.  This is a very common Unix extension and is specified in The Open Group’s ( http://www.opengroup.org external link) Single Unix Specification version 2.  Old versions of Unix called this the save program text bit and used this to indicate executable files that should stay in memory.  Systems that did this ensured that only root could set this bit (otherwise users could have crashed systems by forcing everything into memory).  In Linux, this bit has no effect on ordinary files and ordinary users can modify this bit on the files they own: Linux’s virtual memory management makes this old use irrelevant.

Final note:  Changing the name of a file or deleting it completely are not tasks that require the write() system call.  So a user doesn’t need read (“r”) or write (“w”) permission to rename or delete a file.  You don’t even have to be the owner of a file to delete it (*)!  However, when using mv to move a file to another directory on another disk, (e.g., “mv foo /floppy”) the system must copy the file to the other disk and therefore does need read permission.

Directories in Unix are just files.  They contain little information, just the name of a file and its inode number.  All information about a file is kept in the file’s inode.  (Only the owner can modify the information in the inode, such as the permission bits and group.  Also, only the super-user root can change the owner of a file on most Unix and Linux systems.)

The permission bits on directories control access to different system calls than for regular files:
Read and Write Permission for Directories

To read a directory using read(), opendir(), or readdir() requires read permission.  Note the ls command needs this.

To modify the contents of a directory requires write permission.  If you have write permission on some directory, you can add files to it, rename and delete files from it (this requires execute permission too, as discussed below).

Note you don’t have to be the owner of a file or have write permission on it to rename or delete it!  You only need write permission on the directory that contains the file.
Execute Permission for Directories

The chdir() system call requires execute permission on a directory.  Of course a directory isn’t really a program that you can run, even if it has execute permission.  The execute bit is reused rather than waste space with additional permission bits.

Besides controlling a user’s ability to cd into some directory, the execute permission is required on a directory to use the stat() system call on files within that directory.  The stat() system called is used to access the information in a file’s inode, and must be done before you can open or delete (via the unlink() system call) that file.  (See Note.)

Because of its role in file access the execute bit on a directory is sometimes called search permission.  For example, to read a file foo/bar, you must have read permission for the file itself, but before the file can be accessed you must first search the directory foo for the inode of file bar.  This requires search (“x”) permission on the directory foo.  (Note you don’t need read permission on the directory in this case!  You only need read permission on a directory to list its contents.)
Special Considerations on Directories:
Execute Permission

The use of the execute permission on a directory has some non-obvious effects on file access.  Note that if execute permission is required for a directory, it is usually required for each directory component on the full pathname of that directory.

Without execute permission on a directory, a user can’t access files in a directory even if they own them and have all permissions on them.

With read but not execute, you can do ls someDir but not ls -l someDir.  With execute but not read permission, you can ls -l someDir/file but not ls someDir or ls -l someDir.  Thinking of the system calls involved (read and stat) may help clarify this.  Also, make sure ls isn’t aliased to something such as ls –color or ls -F, since these options change the listing to identify directories, links, and executables by using stat.  (Try /bin/ls each time, or unalias ls.)

Remember that to use ls -l file, or on some systems ls -i dir (i.e., to use stat() system call), you must have execute on the directory, the directory’s parent, and all ancestor directories up to and including “/” (the root directory).

With execute but not read permission on a directory, users cannot list the contents of the directory but can access files within it if they know about them.

A common situation illustrating all this is user web sites.  If a user’s web page is /home/auser/public_html/index.htm, then ‘x’ permission is needed for everyone on /, /home, /home/auser, and /home/auser/public_html, and the file index.htm needs ‘r’ permission for everyone (‘x’ is not needed for the file.)

To delete a file requires both write (to modify the directory itself) and execute (to stat() the file’s inode) on a directory.  Note a user needs no permissions on a file nor be the file’s owner to delete it!

To put or create a file in a directory required both ‘w’ and ‘x’ permissions.  Write permission is needed because you are modifying the directory with a new hard link, and execute permission is needed in order to use stat, open, and creat system calls.  (Creating a file involves trying to open the file first to see if it already exists and stat if it does, and using either ln to create a new hard link or creat to create a new file.)
SUID and SGID for Directories

The SUID bit has no effect on directories.

In Linux and Solaris, when SGID is set on a directory files created in that directory will have their GID automatically reset to that of the directory’s GID.  This means that setting the SGID bit on a directory causes any new files or directories created within to inherit the group identity of that directory rather than that of the user.  Also, new sub-directories will inherit the SGID bit as well.

The purpose of this approach is to support project directories: users can save files into such SGID directories and the group identity of the file automatically changes.  This is useful for example on the Document Root of a website or other directories containing a set of files worked on by a specific group of users.  (It works especially well if each user’s primary group (*) is a private group for that user, and the umask (*) setting is 002).  However, setting the setgid bit on directories is not specified by standards such as the Single Unix Specification [Open Group external link 1997].
Sticky bit on Directories

The sticky bit is used on directories that are writable by group or others.  As noted earlier a user doesn’t have to be the owner of a file to delete it, nor have been granted any permissions on that file.  A user needs only write and execute permission on the directory to delete any file contained within it.  However if the sticky bit is also set on the directory, only the owner of a file (and the super-user) will be able to delete that file.  Public directories such as /tmp use this feature.  (Not all versions of Unix support this use of the sticky bit, unfortunately.)
Other Permission Information:

Some Unixes (notably HP-UX and Solaris) support the idea of file and directory ACLs (Access control lists), which are a means of granting sets of individual users permissions.  You can think of it this way:  Normally a file is associated with a single user (the user owner) and a single group (the group owner).  With ACLs a file can be associated with multiple users and groups, not just the owner user and group.  Each of these groups and users can be granted any of the normal permissions (read, write, or execute).  Note that only the real file owner can change permissions, just as before.

Some ACL implementations do support inheritance of permissions.  However these ACLs are independent of the standard methods described here, which use the 12 permission bits.  (There is a POSIX standard for ACLs but it is not widely used except on Linux.)

If you set the “default” ACL on a directory, then any subsequently created files/directories will also have their ACL set to a copy of this default ACL.  (This is spoken of as new files “inheriting” the default ACL of their parent directory, but this term can be confusing; subsequently changing the default ACL on the parent directory will not change the ACLs of any existing files within that directory.)

Try this (using POSIX ACLs):

mkdir test
touch test/foo
setfacl -d -m user:nobody:r– test
touch test/bar
getfacl -R test

(-d means to change the default ACL,-m means to modify)

You should see that bar is readable by “nobody”, but that foo is not.  When changing the default ACL of a directory, there is a recursive option for setfacl you can use to change the ACLs of existing files as well.  (In the example above, use:

setfacl -R -m user:nobody:r– test

ACLs can be used to solve the per-directory umask problem.  In a highly secure system, umask is set to 077.  But creating a new file in a project workgroup directory, that is a directory holding a group’s project’s files, this is the wrong value since you would want new files to be accessible by group members.  For directories the value is also wrong since you normally want those to have group read, write, and executable permissions.  On a web site, new files need to be group accessible and also read by others; new subdirectories need execute by others too.

Keeping umask set to a highly secure value and setting a default ACL on a directory to add the desired extra group and other permissions per directory works well, especially if the SetGID is also set on that directory.
Rootly Powers

Some operations don’t use the permission (mode) bits to allow or deny access.  In some cases permission solely depends on who is making the request.  For example, only the user owner (or root) can change the permissions.  Other operations require the user to be root.  Examples include halting the system and starting daemons (servers) that listen on “privileged ports” (i.e., TCP and UDP port numbers below 1024).  The kernel simply checks the UID of the process to see if it is “0” (root), and grants or denies access accordingly.

While common in Unix and Linux systems this scheme is flawed, in that many programs must be run as root.  Thus, if an attacker finds some exploit in such a program then that user has gained complete control!  This meant that a web server, print server, DNS server, etc., would all run as root.  Many times in the past this has indeed led to security problems.

In some modern systems (notably Solaris and Linux), internally the rootly powers have been split up into about a dozen separate privileges (the term used on Solaris) or capabilities (the term used on Linux).  This internal change is invisible to most users—root gets all these rights and regular users get none, so the system works exactly as before.

Where it gets interesting is that a program that was started by root (and thus has all rootly power) can selectively give up the rights it doesn’t need.  All modern server programs thus start as root, give up the rights it doesn’t need, uses those rights, and finally sets the UID to a completely non-privileged user.  In this way, even if an attacker finds an exploit in some server daemon, there is very little privilege they can exploit.

You can view a process’s privileges on Solaris using the ppriv command, and on Linux using the getpcaps command.  On either system one can also use the /proc system to see this information.  On Linux for example:

cat /proc/pid/status | grep Cap


The twelve permission bits (or mode bits) discussed above, the three special bits (SUID, SGID, text) and the three groups of user, group, and other permissions, can be changed on any file or directory at the discretion of the owner (or by root).  For this reason such permissions are called discretionary access controls (or “DACs”).  DACs can be considered weak because if an attacker gains access to your system they can change these permissions and do whatever they want.

In modern versions of Unix and Linux an alternative can be used.  A separate permission system can be enabled that loads a policy at boot time that determines who can do what.  This policy cannot be modified without a reboot.  (See Note.) Because the system will require a process to have these permissions to proceed with some operation, this system is called mandatory access controls (or “MACs”).

If MAC is enabled, both MAC and DAC systems must allow some operation.  For example, if the DAC permissions allow some user to read a file but the MAC policy doesn’t, or if the MAC policy does allow a user to read some file but the DAC doesn’t, then access is denied.

Several MAC systems are available.  For Linux, consider using SELinux external link or LIDS external link.

March 3, 2009

How complicated a windows share could be?

Filed under: 6. MISC — Tags: , , , , , — zhefeng @ 11:28 am

Setting up a windows shares is pretty straighforward, just right clicking the folder and give the proper permissions for sharing/security then you done!
But when things come together if you are using a VM machine plus dns alias for machine name, to access the share is not that easy any more. Lots of tricky part need to be done
in the windows registry.

Here is the full story about that.

Machine name:        vmwin056 (windows 2003 server VM on ESX server)
DNS alias(cname):    dbrepl
share folder path:    C:\dbrepl_source
Share name:        \\dbrepl\dbrepl_source
domain name:        test
Account name:        service.acc

It seems everything is ok and you can access \\dbrepl\dbrepl_source. But life is not that easy as you expected.

###Issue 1: when you try to connect the shared folder remotely, you may get some invalid account error information EVEN you’ve given the correct account/password.
This will happen especially when you did some rollbacks for your VM images. if you take a look at the share permission tab,
the account here will be some weird number like: s178453728.

The reason is in windows 2003 domain, the workstation and PDC exchange password every 7 days. if you rollback the VM machine back, the password are not sync up any more so
you’re screwed.

Solution(MS reference:http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;q175468):
1). quit the domain on your workstation and re-join the domain, in this way you will get a new copy from PDC so they are sync up again.
2). in order to avoiding this happend again, disable the passwd changing by editing this registry entry to:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINES\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters\DisablePasswordChange=1 (REG_DWORD)

###Issue 2: You get error like “Access denied” or “No network provider accepted the given network path”
The reason is because Windows Server 2003 (starts from SP1) includes a new security feature named loopback check functionality. By default, loopback check functionality is turned on in Windows Server 2003 SP1, and the value of the DisableLoopbackCheck registry entry is set to 0 (zero).

Solution(MS reference:http://support.microsoft.com/kb/926642):
Re-enable the behaviour that exists in Windows Server 2003 by setting the DisableLoopbackCheck registry entry in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa registry subkey to 1. To set the DisableLoopbackCheck registry entry to 1, follow these steps on the client computer:
1).Click Start, click Run, type regedit, and then click OK.
2).Locate and then click the following registry subkey: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa
3).Right-click Lsa, point to New, and then click DWORD Value.
4).Type DisableLoopbackCheck, and then press ENTER.
5).Right-click DisableLoopbackCheck, and then click Modify.
6).In the Value data box, type 1, and then click OK.
7).Exit Registry Editor.

###Issue 3: After these tuned up above, you think you are ok to go, but you may still get error like this “A duplicate name exists on the network”
The reason is windows 2003 has problem with cname access.This problem can occur when you try to connect to the server by using a CNAME alias that is created in the DNS zone.

Solution(MS reference:http://support.microsoft.com/kb/281308):
To resolve this problem in Windows Server 2003, complete the following steps:
Create the CNAME record for the file server on the appropriate DNS server, if the CNAME record is not already present.
Apply the following registry change to the file server. To do so, follow these steps:
1).Start Registry Editor (Regedt32.exe).
2).Locate and click the following key in the registry:
3).On the Edit menu, click Add Value, and then add the following registry value:
Value name: DisableStrictNameChecking
Data type: REG_DWORD
Radix: Decimal
Value: 1
4).Quit Registry Editor.
5).Restart your compute

Now everything is really ok. Enjoy the sharing:

C:\>net use w: \\dbrepl\dbrepl_source /user:test\service.acc *
Type the password for \\dbrepl\dbrepl_source:
The command completed successfully.

C:\>dir w:
Volume in drive W has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 98DF-E535

Directory of W:\

02/24/2009  11:20 AM    <DIR>          .
02/24/2009  11:20 AM    <DIR>          ..
02/24/2009  11:20 AM                 7 firstlevel_file.txt
02/17/2009  10:11 AM    <DIR>          test
02/24/2009  11:19 AM    <DIR>          testfolder200902231150am
1 File(s)              7 bytes
4 Dir(s)  29,964,087,296 bytes free


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